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Abstract*
En muy poco tiempo de diferencia Francia y España vivieron los dos desastres de contaminación 
marítima más graves de su historia. Pese a los parecidos fácticos de ambos accidentes y a pesar que 
ambos países tienen una normativa ambiental armonizada, muy distintas han sido sus soluciones 
jurídicas. El análisis de los casos Prestige y Erika desde una perspectiva comparada permite a los 
autores reflexionar sobre las posibilidades y los límites de la protección penal del medio ambiente y 
mostrar la indignación contra un sistema legal global que establece una irresponsabilidad organizada 
para la contaminación marítima. 
 
In a short time difference France and Spain experienced the two most serious maritime pollution 
disasters in their history. Despite the factual similarities of both accidents and although both 
countries have harmonized environmental regulations, the legal solutions in each case have been 
very different. Analysis of the Prestige and Erika cases from a comparative perspective allows the 
authors to reflect on the possibilities and limitations of the criminal protection of the environment 
and show the indignation against a global legal system that establishes an organized irresponsibility 
for sea polluters.    
Título: Posibilidades y límites de la protección del medioambiente a través del Derecho Penal. Reflexiones 
sobre los casos Erika y Prestige (o de cómo el sistema de irresponsabilidad organizada se mantiene) 
 
Palabras Clave: delitos de contaminación marítima. 
Keywords: pollution crimes. 
  
                                                          
* This article is the conclusion the authors took after their two readings on the module of training course 
Maritime pollution crimes, case law-Erika and Prestige Case organized by Judicial training and research 
on EU crimes against environment and maritime pollution in Lecce, 6th December 2012.  
The Spanish reflections were developed under the research project Prevention and punishment of 
economic crime led by Dr. Mercedes García Arán and subsidized by the Spanish Ministry of Science and 
Innovation [DER201-18688]. 
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1. Introduction: the symbolic functions of environmental criminal law 
1. In barely three years’ time, two marine pollution accidents took place off European 
Atlantic coasts. In 1999 the Erika and in 2002 the Prestige were involved in the biggest 
environmental accidents that have ever occurred in France and Spain respectively. Apart 
from the coincidence in time and the catastrophic consequences1, both cases have a great 
deal of features in common. Both ships were following the same route along the English 
Channel, they were flying a flag of convenience, their shipowners and operators had 
different nationalities, and in spite of their deplorable state of preservation they both had 
all mandatory reports in order. Moreover, besides these factual aspects, they both have 
involved procedural difficulties typical of such environmental offences2. These common 
aspects, which are not mere coincidences, should all alone allow us to draw some final 
conclusions3
2. Nevertheless, in spite of the similarities, there are a great deal of differences as to the 
criminal resolutions of both accidents. We may say in advance that while the enforcement 
of the Spanish Criminal Code by the Spanish courts in the Prestige case may allow us to 
reflect on the limits of environmental criminal law, the enforcement of French criminal law 
by French courts in the Erika case may be used as a counterpoint to draw some conclusions 
on its possibilities. At any rate, the fact that two so similar marine pollution situations have 
lead to such different legal resolutions—and in two countries integrated within a European 
Union having a harmonized legislation and high environmental protection standards—
should allow us to reflect on the causes in national and international law of such failure. 
. 
Even though we are strongly in favor of criminal prosecution to protect the environment, 
we are also aware of its limits, especially since the criminal doctrine successfully started to 
interpret environmental criminal law from the perspective of the “risk society” sociological 
paradigm put forward by Ulrich BECK4
 
.  
                                                          
1 As for the Erika, more than 20.000 tons of oil were spilled, polluting about 400 kilometers of coast in the 
south of Brittany, the estuary of France’s biggest river—the Loire—, and the Vendée coast, one of France’s 
main touristic areas. In the case of the Prestige, the oil slick covered more than 1,600 kilometers of coast, 
from the mouth of the Minho River, on the Portuguese-Galician border, to the French Atlantic coast. In 
total approximately 1,900 kilometers of Spanish and French coast were affected. In Spain around 141,000 
tons of oily waste were collected, with a particular impact in the National Park of the Atlantic Islands, in 
Galicia, while in France the waste collected amounted to around 18,300 tons. The massive arrival of 
volunteers—up to 11,366 people per day—minimized the consequences of the catastrophe. 
2 As for the Prestige, it is without a doubt the biggest legal case ever tried is Spain: the committal 
proceedings amount to 230,315 pages, the preliminary inquiry has lasted 10 years, the injured parties have 
joined in 55 private prosecutions, and there are more than 2,000 injured parties, which have finally been 
reduced to 1,500. In November 2012 the big trial started, with the participation of 70 lawyers, 27 attorneys, 
140 witnesses, 98 pieces of expert evidence, and it is expected to last 7 months. Total compensation: 4.122 
billion euros. 
3 See infra, our conclusions. 
4 BECK, Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, 1986. 
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3. Among its most distinctive aspects, the following three may be highlighted. Firstly, the 
power of today’s dangers has changed in comparison to previous times. They constitute 
“new” risks, they did not exist in the industrial societies of the 19th century, and they are 
brought about by technological development (risks derived from genetics, new 
communication technologies, nuclear energy, environmental pollution, the massive 
consumption of food products, the development of chemical weapons, etc.). Furthermore, 
they are “large scale” risks, i.e., they threaten an uncertain and potentially enormous 
number of people. Examples such as the nuclear accidents of Chernobyl or Fukushima—
not to mention the Prestige and Erika accidents—prove that these risks affect the global 
population, going beyond borders and people’s economic condition.  And they are 
“artificial” risks, inasmuch as they are produced by human activity and are connected to a 
human decision as “side effects”, unwanted consequences, often unforeseen but, at any rate, 
functional to a capitalist economic model based on production and massive consumption. 
Secondly, it is difficult to identify the person or persons responsible for such risks, as 
liability relationships feature a high organizational complexity. The considerable increase 
in causal interconnections, synergies, accumulations, and the lack of knowledge about 
them or the difficulties to clarify them have lead to the concept of “organized 
irresponsibility”5
And thirdly, indeed as a consequence of the two aspects highlighted above, contemporary 
risk society is characterized by a “subjective feeling of security”, which may exist even 
regardless of the presence of real risks and is linked to a social demand for security 
specifically through regulations. 
.  
4. This new sociological model has enabled criminal doctrine not only to understand, but 
even to justify a new political-criminal law tendency: the so-called “risk criminal law”6
So, firstly, considering they were “new” risks, it was justified to “expand criminal law” in 
order to encompass a set of domains which had been traditionally regulated by 
administrative or even civil law. Particularly because they are “artificial” risks, i.e. caused 
by humans, it was reasonable to think that the recourse to criminal law and to the threat of 
punishment could generate some motivating effect.  
, 
which served as a framework for the criminal law reforms of the 80’s and 90’s to create new 
offences in the following areas: environmental risks, nuclear risks, computer risks, chemical 
risks, genetic risks, and food risks.  
Furthermore, as they are “large scale” risks, the infringement—not even the 
endangerment—of individual legal rights was not expected and therefore collective legal 
rights were protected by using legal definition of the word “dangerous”. And if such risks 
were “necessary consequences” of our economic model, based on production and the massive 
consumption of goods, lawmakers were compelled to establish in criminal law tolerance 
                                                          
5 BECK, Gegengifte. Die organisierte Unverantwortlichkeit, 1988. 
6 See, for instance, in Spain, MENDOZA, El derecho penal en la sociedad del riesgo, 2001. 
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levels of such risks, as they were functional—even necessary—to our economic model. 
Such tolerance has become evident in several ways and it indeed explains some of the main 
effectiveness and enforcement problems faced in environmental offences. Thus, for 
instance, the punishment systems which have been implemented practically guarantee 
non-imprisonment7; or negligence behaviors have been deemed criminal only when it was 
considered “serious”8; or the ancillary nature of criminal law to administrative law has been 
invoked by stating that the core of the offence is not to be situated in the act of pollution 
itself, but in the infringement of the tolerance level to risk laid down by the law or by 
administrative decisions9
Secondly, also in favor of risk criminal law, it has been said that, as it is difficult to attribute 
the responsibility for risks, criminal proceedings make it possible to identify and attribute 
the responsibility to convicted offenders, whom, furthermore, the judgment makes it 
possible to consider “guilty”.  
.  
Lastly, as pointed out above, such new, large-scale risks (regarding which it is difficult to 
identify someone responsible since there probably are several people responsible for them, 
either by action or by inaction—in fact, we all probably are responsible for them—) 
generate a great feeling of insecurity, of fear, which is, all in all, a major feature of 
postmodern societies.  With regard to this aspect, the criminal doctrine has also realized 
that risk criminal law fulfills a symbolic function that tends to deal with such feeling of 
insecurity. In other words, apart from possible instrumental functions for the protection of 
legal rights by means of prevention, criminal actions to protect the environment perform 
essentially—even exclusively—symbolic functions, which are value judgment or even 
propagandistic.  
5. So, as pointed out above, we believe that the analysis of the Prestige and Erika cases has 
confirmed the possibilities and the limits of environmental criminal protection and, with it, 
those of “risk criminal law”. Reasoning as well as on national considerations (revealed by 
the Prestige case) and international ones (revealed by the Erika case), we claim there is no 
way we can efficiently defend environmental issues as long as law keeps on structuring 
itself on an organized irresponsibility model which benefits major pollutants.  
                                                          
7 As regards acts of pollution in Spain, introduced as an offence in 1983, the penalties of imprisonment 
imposed by the Criminal Code have always been suspended or replaced when the minimum penalty is 
applied. 
8 In Spain, section 331 of the Criminal Code establishes that ecological offences shall be punished “when 
they have been committed because of serious negligence”. 
9 This is the case of Spain, and Italy, where the requirement for an environmental offence is that the act of 
pollution has to have “infringed environment protection laws or general provisions” (ancillary nature of 
criminal law to administrative law), as well as other countries, where it depends on whether it has been 
committed “without administrative authorization” (ancillary nature of criminal law to administrative 
decisions). 
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2. The Prestige case10
 
: a textbook case on how organized irresponsibility 
prevails in national proceedings. 
6.  Levity of the Spanish judicial authorities concerning their indictment decisions. 
Indeed, the Prestige accident was a clear example of “organized irresponsibility”, and it was 
so in the two moments of the accident that are criminally relevant.  
7. The first moment was when one of the ship’s tanks cracked open and about 10.000 tons 
of oil were spilled. There are a great number of people who could be attributed criminal 
liability for a negligence pollution offence (section 331 in connection with section 325 of the 
Spanish Criminal Code).  
To begin with, apparently the captain, of Greek nationality. According to the Public 
Prosecutor’s indictment, apparently: on the last inspection the captain concealed 
information on the ship’s deficiencies, he concealed information on the ship’s high seas 
bunkering activity for several months, he had the ‘master valve’ unrepaired for months, 
which makes several automatic safety devices inoperative, the towing devices were not in 
good condition, etc. However, he probably was not the only liable person possible.  
In fact, the Audiencia Provincial (Provincial Court) of A Coruña requested the examining 
magistrate (order 96/2003, of September 9) to investigate the criminal liability not only of 
the captain, but also of the shipowner, the shipping company and the operating company, 
since they acquiesced in the carriage of a highly polluting cargo in a ship which, despite 
having all mandatory reports in order, they knew it did not meet the necessary safety 
conditions. As pointed out above, the Prestige had all certificates required by maritime 
regulations on construction, safety and prevention of pollution in the marine environment, 
it was correctly loaded according to the corresponding loading manual and it met the 
MARPOL requirements applying to ships of its class. The liability of all these people in 
charge of the ship’s operation rather arises from the fact that they were aware of the ship’s 
bad condition and—despite being the guarantors of the quality of the ship’s components 
and of the technical legitimacy of its commercial use—they did not prevent it from 
navigating, nor did they notify the classification society ABS that the ship had carried out 
high seas bunkering services in the Baltic Sea, which eventually weakened the ship’s hull. 
This is thus a case of “accessory negligence perpetration”, which takes place when two or more 
negligent acts, carried out separately, without mutual awareness or agreement, objectively 
co-determine the offence11
                                                          
10 At the time of writing this article, no judgment had been given on the Prestige case. As a consequence, all 
our statements on the events have been made based on the Public Prosecutor’s indictment and we are 
aware that all defendants are protected by the presumption of innocence. 
. However, in spite of everything, as regards this first criminally 
11 This has been expressed by MARTÍNEZ-BUJÁN, Crónica Penal (Del Prestige y de otros relatos jurídico-penales), 
2005. The classification society ABS may probably be situated at another level, since it did not have the 
obligation to check the ship’s state of preservation, nor was it the guarantor of the quality of the ship’s 
components or of the technical legitimacy of its commercial use. In fact, the Spanish government has only 
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relevant deed the Public Prosecutor has indicted solely the ship’s captain and the chief 
engineer. 
8. But in the Prestige accident yet a second criminally relevant episode may be clearly 
highlighted: the Spanish authorities decided to tow the ship out to sea when it approached 
the Galician coast to be emptied after one of its tanks cracked. As a matter of fact, this was 
the most grievous action, as it caused to ship to split in two, thereby polluting the whole 
Cantabrian coast. All reports coincide in that the ship should have been towed to a 
sheltered area, as the captain decided, and that the Spanish authorities made the wrong 
decisions: first, to start the ship’s main engine, thus creating a vibration which weakened 
its structure, and second, to tow the ship out to the northwest, straight to the storm, which 
was the worst course possible and it definitely worsened greatly the ship’s condition, as it 
had to put up with the pounding of thousends of waves12
In this case the offences in question are of two types: an offence of damage to protected 
natural areas (section 330 of the Spanish Criminal Code) simultaneously with an offence of 
patrimonial damage (section 263 of the Spanish Criminal Code), attributable also to many 
other people. As a matter of fact, the Audiencia Provincial asked the examining magistrate 
(order 95/2003) to investigate the evidence of criminal liability of such decisions.  
. 
Apart from the director of the merchant navy, who made the technical decision of towing 
the ship away from the coast, the Audiencia Provincial of A Coruña might be thinking of 
the members of the crisis cabinet, such as the chief of the harbor master’s office, who in the 
order is described as “a qualified executor of the orders given by the maritime authority, without 
prejudice to that fact that, given his technical knowledge, his task was also to provide data and 
opinions”. Furthermore, the Audiencia Provincial of A Coruña suggested in the same order 
that it was necessary “to know if there had been a crucial approval or ratification by people holding 
a position hierarchically higher than the maritime authority”. So it was also attributing possible 
criminal liability to the political decision-makers of the Ministry of Development 
(Ministerio de Fomento), at the time led by Mr. Álvarez Cascos, who were coordinated by 
the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Mariano Rajoy. 
However, despite the great number of possible liable people, in the end the Public 
Prosecutor’s indictment attributed criminal liability solely to the captain. It sought 12 years’ 
imprisonment and a fine to be paid for 60 months in daily installments of 24 euros, as well 
as a reparation for damage for having committed (a) an intentional offence against the 
environment as described and punished by section 325.1 in connection with sections 326, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
filed a civil action against this classification society in the United States. The chartering company may also 
be situated at another level, without prejudice to the civil liability it may have. 
12 A great number of expert reports and technical opinions share this view. As for expert reports, see the 
one written by Felipe Louzán, a prestigious captain of the merchant navy, or the one written by Joan 
Zamora Terrés, director of the Center for Logistics and Maritime Services of the UPC (Universitat 
Politècnica de Catalunya). As for technical opinions, the Spanish Association of the Civilian Navy has 
described the decision to tow out the ship as an “aberration”. MARTÍNEZ-BUJÁN, Crónica Penal (Del 
Prestige y de otros relatos jurídico-penales), 2005.provides full information on these aspects. 
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subsections b) and e), and 338 of the Criminal Code, with an actual overlapping of offences, 
(b) an intentional offence of damage on a protected natural area as described and punished 
by section 330 of the Criminal Code, and (c) an offence of damage as described and 
punished by sections 266.2 and 266.4 in connection with sections 263 and 264.4 of the 
Criminal Code, with a technical overlapping of offences among both13
9. Inadequacy of the criminal legal requirements with the purpose of environmental 
offenses. Secondly, also bearing in mind the difficulty to identify the causes of 
environmental risks, the Prestige case is also a good instance of how in environmental 
offences it is very difficult to determine the cause-effect relationship of dangers, especially 
because of the presence of accumulation or synergy processes. Indeed, as regards the first 
act of pollution, some reports included in the proceedings
. So it is easy to 
conclude that the criminal proceedings are a means to identify a scapegoat, who is to carry 
the blame in this context of “organized irresponsibility”. 
14
Indeed, that has been the motive used by US courts to dismiss the suit brought by Spain vs. 
ABS, the classification and insurance society. While Spain alleged that ABS’s negligent 
inspection and certification of the ship had led to the wreck, New York’s courts dismissed 
the suit arguing that Spain had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of such reckless 
conduct. Spain based its suit on the surveys carried out by ABS on two sister ships of the 
Prestige: the Centaur and the Alexandros. In 1996 the structural fatigue in the hull of these 
two oil tankers was analyzed and it was concluded that within a short period of time—four 
to five years—they would suffer structural failures in the same area where the hull of the 
Prestige cracked. Following this conclusion, both ships were scrapped. The problem is that 
according to US courts this crucial information was never communicated to the surveyors 
examining the Prestige and the computer program SafeHull was never used on it. However, 
the court argues that Spain did not introduce sufficient evidence of this “congenital 
deficiency”. 
 point out that it has not been 
possible to determine the cause of the breakdown and therefore any explanations are pure 
speculation. Up to six possible causes for the initial accident are mentioned and they may 
not be mutually exclusive, they may have combined to provoke the tanker’s structural 
failure. 
10. Additionally, the Prestige case has revealed another limit of risk criminal law: even 
though risk criminal law intends to manage risks, it admits as a starting point the need to 
tolerate them, as they are “necessary consequences” (“Nebenfolgen”, in Beck’s terms) of our 
economic model, based on production and consumption.  
 
                                                          
13 The full text of the Public Prosecutor’s indictment is available at: 
http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/201006/09/espana/20100609elpepunac_1_Pes_
PDF.pdf.  
14 For instance the “Zamora report”, written by a group of specialists from the UPC (Universitat 
Politècnica de Catalunya) and commissioned by one of the prosecutions brought in the name of the people 
(acciones populares), filed by the political party Izquierda Unida. 
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In spite of the environmental disaster, in the end in order to construct criminal liability it 
must be proved that “environment protection laws or general provisions” have been infringed, 
which will be used as a technical argument, so that eventually no criminal liability will be 
attributed to any of the companies operating the ship. As explained above, according to the 
reports apparently the tanker’s structure met the normative requirements in force at the 
moment of its construction, particularly those regarding its resistance to bending and shear 
stress. The reports also state that the ship had been correctly loaded and it met MARPOL 
requirements applying to ships of its class. So the Prestige had all certificates required by 
maritime regulations in force at the time on construction, safety and prevention of 
pollution in the marine environment, and the day it sank it had all due certificates on its 
safety in order, as it had passed all inspections—public and private—performed on it.  
11. Another manifestation of this level of tolerance in environmental offences can be found 
in the type of negligence of the offence. As it is required that the negligence be “serious”, 
the criminal liability of minor negligence is then dismissed, which would explain that even 
in the hypothetical case that the rest of agents (shippers, owners, insurance companies, etc.) 
were prosecuted the deed finally carried out could not be objectively attributed to the 
negligent action, because the overlapping of negligence would have the effect of 
downgrading the seriousness of the negligence of some people or even of all of them. 
12. Declarations of intent used to lull public opinion. Lastly, the Prestige case is also a 
good example of how criminal law fulfills essentially symbolic functions. Its instrumental 
functions to prevent offences through the motivation of conducts are pushed to the 
background and it takes symbolic functions, which are value judgment and propagandistic. 
Such value-judgment functions can be clearly seen, for instance, in the proposal for a 
directive on the protection of the environment through criminal law of 2001, which literally 
recognized that “the imposition of criminal sanctions demonstrates a social disapproval of a 
qualitatively different nature compared to administrative sanctions or a compensation mechanism 
under civil law”. As for propagandistic functions, the criminalization of such conducts and 
the more than likely conviction against the ship’s captain will surely have a tranquilizing 
effect, as public authorities will appear to have done something about it although they will 
not provide an effective solution to environmental problems.  
In fact, we believe that Directive 2005/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 September 2005 on ship-source pollution, which was issued as a response to 
the Erika and Prestige accidents, includes a clearly propagandistic declaration of criminal 
intervention, as it recognizes that “the required dissuasive effects can only be achieved through 
the introduction of penalties applying to any person who causes or contributes to marine pollution; 
penalties should be applicable not only to the shipowner or the master of the ship, but also the owner 
of the cargo, the classification society or any other person involved”. The mere public declaration 
of intent may apparently be enough to achieve such effects, but, as we shall see in the 
conclusions, the real need is to move forward on legal reforms in other areas. 
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3. The Erika case: an eye-opener case on how international law establishes an 
organized irresponsibility system. 
 
13. Putting an end to more than a decade of judicial proceedings, the French Supreme 
Court’s decision in the Erika case (Cass. Crim., Sept. 25th, 2012, n°10-82.938) broached many 
fundamental issues at the forefront of which is the question of identifying coastal States’ 
competences when it comes to repressing maritime oil-pollutions caused beyond their 
territorial seas. Such stakes are decisive for those who consider that oil companies should 
be liable on criminal grounds, so much it is true that international conventional rules tend 
to assert an “organized irresponsibility” for the ships’ charterers. Therefore, only a national 
legislation can possibly try to establish a new order of things, by enacting more severe 
offenses. In the Erika case, this reasoning led to Total’s conviction15. But up to the final 
decision, the risk that all the proceeding under the French jurisdictions could fall was 
manifest16
 
, and quite complex to counter.  
14. An uppermost competence granted to the Flag State’s jurisdiction. Firstly, it was not 
obvious that the French jurisdictions were competent to rule the case. Let’s keep in mind 
that article 228 of the Montego Bay Convention assures an uppermost competence to the 
Flag State’s jurisdictions (except if the coastal State prosecutes “major damages”)17
 
, and in a 
way, French jurisdictions were lucky enough that the ‘Erika’ ship sailed under the Maltese 
flag because Malta rarely prosecutes in such similar cases. Therefore its inertia left an 
opportunity for the coastal State to take over the case. But the legal basis of the coastal 
State’s proceedings can be challenged. 
For the French Supreme Court, article 220 § 6 of the Montego Bay Convention authorizes 
the coastal State to prosecute pollution offenses that occur beyond its territory and that 
                                                          
15 Total was found guilty of the criminal offense, alongside of the ship owner (Guiseppe Savarese, via his 
company Tevere Shipping), the ship manager (Antonio Pollara via his company Panship) and the 
certification company (SpA Rina). Apart from the fines (370.000 euros for Total and Rina, 75.000 euros for 
MM. Savarese and Pollara), all four were sentenced to pay civil damages (200,6 million euros). In front of 
the Court of appeal, Total was exempted of paying these damages, but this part of the decision was broken 
by the Supreme Court.  
16 Indeed, the Supreme Court Public prosecutor pleaded for the cancellation of all the proceedings, 
considering that the French legislation under which the prosecution had been engaged did not comply 
with the relevant international law.  
17 Article 228 states : “1 - Proceedings to impose penalties in respect of any violation of applicable laws and 
regulations or international rules and standards relating to the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from 
vessels committed by a foreign vessel beyond the territorial sea of the State instituting proceedings shall be suspended 
upon the taking of proceedings to impose penalties in respect of corresponding charges by the flag State within six 
months of the date on which proceedings were first instituted, unless those proceedings relate to a case of major 
damage to the coastal State or the flag State in question has repeatedly disregarded its obligation to enforce effectively 
the applicable international rules and standards in respect of violations committed by its vessels (…) 3 - the 
provisions of this article are without prejudice to the right of the flag State to take any measures, including 
proceedings to impose penalties, according to its laws irrespective of prior proceedings by another State” 
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have caused serious damages. Article 221 can also be quoted18, and to some extent, article 
5619. But it has been objected that in the Montego Bay Convention’s approach, articles 220 § 
6 and 221 only covers State’s police powers20, and not a jurisdictional competence, even if 
the wording isn’t that clear21
 
. This keen breach has nevertheless been exploited by the 
Supreme Court. But we must note that this solution is weakened by some relevant 
academic challenges. Therefore, even if the coastal damages can be considered as ‘major’, it 
is not obvious that the Montego Bay conventions authorize a coastal State to judicially 
prosecute on the grounds of articles 220 §6 and 228, as the Supreme court states.  
Generally speaking, the uppermost competence given to the Flag State disturbs the 
readability of the environmental aims of the convention. Indeed, if the Flag State’s 
legislation is not very committed on environmental issues, and tries to attract economic 
interests by enforcing very little constraints weighing on the ship’s owner and charterer, it 
shall prevail if this State decides to rule the case against other State’s intentions to do as 
well (except in the case of major damage caused to the coastal State… which is not always 
the case).Thus, according to international conventional law, the legal possibility of 
defending environmental interests over economic ones depends on geopolitical decisions, 
admitted that these economic interests are granted a theoretical precedence… an obvious 
paradox, one would say, regarding the goals of the international conventions involved.  
 
15. Lively controversy on how national legislation must comply with international rules. 
Secondly, it has been constantly argued that the French offense, under which ‘Total’ had 
                                                          
18 Article 221 states : “Nothing in this Part shall prejudice the right of States, pursuant to international law, both 
customary and conventional, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual or 
threatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of 
pollution following upon a maritime casualty or acts relating to such a casualty, which may reasonably be expected to 
result in major harmful consequences”. 
19 Article 56 states : “1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has (a) sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic 
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds; (b) 
jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to (…) (iii) the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment; 
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal 
State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the 
provisions of this Convention.” 
20 CUENDET, «Les compétences de l’Etat en matière de répression des rejets polluants dans sa zone 
économique exclusive : quelles leçons après l’affaire de l’Erika ?», Environnement et développement durable, 
jan. 2013, n°1, p.25 
21 Article 220 § 6 states : “Where there is clear objective evidence that a vessel navigating in the exclusive economic 
zone or the territorial sea of a State has, in the exclusive economic zone, committed a violation referred to in 
paragraph 3 resulting in a discharge causing major damage or threat of major damage to the coastline or related 
interests of the coastal State, or to any resources of its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone, that State may, 
subject to section 7, provided that the evidence so warrants, institute proceedings, including detention of the vessel, 
in accordance with its laws.”. If one takes in account other paragraphs of article 220 that concern EEZ, and 
particularly § 3 and 5, these rules only aim police measures, which tends to confirm that article 220 only 
deals with police measures.  
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been prosecuted, did not comply with the international rules. According to the Montego 
Bay Convention, if a coastal State uses its jurisdiction in order to protect maritime 
environment, it must do so in respect of article 211 § 5 which states that national 
legislations must comply with international law. And so, the MARPOL Convention. Yet, 
this agreement states that voluntary or involuntary oil leakages are forbidden for all ships. 
But in case of an accidental shipwreck, an exemption cause is possible, “provided that all 
reasonable precautions have been taken after the occurrence of the damage or discovery of the 
discharge, for the purpose of preventing or minimizing the discharge”, except if “the owner or the 
Master acted either with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that damage 
would probably result”22
 
. Even if it is not that clear, the offense seems to aim exclusively the 
liability of the ship’s captain and owner, and not its charterer.  
The French legislation enacts a very different offense, considered as autonomous. Indeed, 
article 8 of the Law of July 5th, 1983, punishes accidents that were caused by recklessness, 
negligence, as well as non-observance of the legislation ; it allows no exemption cause and 
it aims the liability of anyone in charge of the ship’s conduct or running (including the 
charterer); it adds the condition of a pollution affecting the national territory, and does not 
explicitly state it applies to France’s EEZ ; finally, the offense is punished by the use of fines 
as well as of prison sentences. Obviously, French law is more severe than the MARPOL 
rules. For all that, can it be considered as complying with them? It all depends on how we 
understand the word of “complying”.  
 
16. The French Supreme Court answered positively to the question, just as the Paris court 
of appeal did before, arguing that at least, French legislation complied with the goals and 
aims of the MARPOL and Montego Bay conventions. Even if the Parisian judges gave a 
very convincing argument – the fact that the 1969 Vienna convention states that 
International agreements are interpreted in the light of their object and goals23
  
 – and 
despite that it is true that article 4 of the MARPOL convention invites countries to enforce 
rigorous legislations in order to dissuade possible offenders, the argumentation followed 
by the French judges can be challenged.   
Indeed, for what concerns EEZs, a coastal State holds specific powers only because the 
Montego Bay convention allows and enforces them. This convention tries to establish a 
compromise between States’ legitimate rights to protect their interests, and the liberty for 
anyone to use a maritime zone that is not the territory of a specific State, but in some way 
belongs to everyone. If a coastal State unilaterally heightens the severity of the common 
rule, it thus decides of something for which it has little legitimacy to, and threatens the 
compromise. It therefore seems paradoxical to defend the idea that the goals and aims of 
both conventions legitimate a conduct that reconsiders the compromise on which both 
agreements are founded.  
 
                                                          
22 Rules 9 and 11, Appendix 1 of the MARPOL convention 
23 Article 31 §1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23rd 1969 
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We can nevertheless object that environmental issues are that important for the interests of 
all, that they do strengthen the coastal State’s legitimacy to act this way. The use of EEZ 
being essentially for economic reasons, the French Supreme Court’s decision ultimately 
consecrates the pre-eminence of environmental considerations over business interests…a 
position which complies with European rules, but which is not shared by all the countries 
in the world. We must nevertheless keep in mind that in the past, some countries, in order 
to prevent environmental disasters, did enact national legislations that were more severe 
than the international conventional rules24. In a way, this refers to an international custom25
 
 
whose networking with the Montego Bay and MARPOL conventions forbids us to consider 
that these two fundamental agreements apply strictly, and oppose more harsh national 
offenses.  
17. We can regret that the French Supreme Court did not, on this issue, develop a 
sufficiently detailed and solid argumentation, contenting itself to raise the French law 
compliance with the international conventions aims and goals. It seems that what mattered 
most in this case was to convict Total, more than to find an undisputable legal basis that 
could change the perception of coastal States’ competences. An opportunity to speed up 
the process of challenging international rules was, unfortunately, missed here.  
 
18. The charterer’s conviction: a combination of factors above all. And so it is that the oil 
group was convicted, because prior to the shipwreck, it had voluntarily undertook a 
vetting operation on the ‘Erika’, and thus, was considered negligent owing to the 
information it held on the ship’s condition before it departed. Total therefore gave the stick 
with which it has been beaten. But what if the oil group had refrained from undertaking 
the vetting operation (which, likely, will be the case in the future) ? Clearly, no offense 
would have been detected under the French law, since negligence entails to prove a prior 
knowledge that only a vetting operation can assure. One can always try to assert that no 
matter the conduct and the concrete undertakings of the charterer company, it should have 
a precise knowledge of the ship’s condition before its departure26
 
, according to a security 
performance obligation, but there are no legal grounds in national or international law for 
such a reasoning. There aren’t even any for a duty obligation.  
19. If, for the environmental cause defendants, the Erika case is presented as a victory, for 
the legal practitioner, this victory is rather slim: Total was indeed convicted not only 
because Malta chose not to prosecute in the first place, but also because the oil-company 
undertook a voluntary decision that put its criminal liability on the line, within the 
framework of French criminal law ; as for the argumentation that sustains the conviction, 
we saw that it could be challenged in very relevant ways.  
                                                          
24 For example : the Canadian arctic waters pollution prevention act (June 17, 1970) ; the US oil pollution 
act (August 1990) 
25 MOORADIAN, «Protecting ‘Sovereign rights’ : the case for increased coastal state jurisdiction over vessel-
source pollution in the exclusive economic zone», Boston University Law Review (82), 2002, p.798 
26 This logic is massively put into practice in French labor law, and more precisely in accident at work law, 
as well as car accident law.  
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However, we must welcome a decision which brings up, in a fine way, all the 
inconsistencies and deficiencies of the international conventional rules when it comes to 
repressing oil-pollution in the maritime environment.   
 
20. By way of conclusion, and as from the French Erika decision’s contribution, it seems 
obvious (for those who defend environmental interests at least) that international rules 
must change substantially, in order to set up a system where all the different actors take on 
their responsibilities in case of an accidental maritime pollution. This must lead to a 
profound cultural revolution in the way law comprehends environmental crimes: no 
company, whatever it’s activity, should have the legal certainty that it can follow its 
economic interests without taking into consideration its possible impact on environment, 
and in doing so, its judicial liability for participating, directly or indirectly, intentionnally 
or not, in a pollution damage. From the moment the activity is potentially dangerous for 
the environment – because the ship owned is in bad condition, or because the cargo owned 
is pollutant – there is an evident link with the damage, and it is fair that society requires 
from these companies demanding precautious behaviors.  
These prior considerations speak in favour of a break with the idea of letting the Flag State 
jurisdictions prevail on the coastal State’s in case of an accidental shipwreck in an EEZ. 
Above the issue of fighting against flags of convienience, international law must now 
accept its aim to protect victims rather than the troublemakers. This means, more 
fondamentally, that international law must systematically protect environmental interests 
above economic ones (above any other, could we say), because environment is of general 
interest, and damages against it threaten the coastal State’s economy and development 
options. This also means that international law must accept, explicitly, that its rules are 
only a minimum standard, so much that harsher national rules can be applied if this is the 
result of the coastal State’s choice.  
Our conclusions therefore promote the idea of a new conceptualization of EEZs, sliding 
from the concept of ‘exclusive economic zones’ to the one of ‘economic and ecological 
protection zones’ where the coastal States’ competences and sovereign rights would be 
increased. Indeed, this proposal detracts the principle of mare liberum, and in a way 
reintroduces the claim of State’s new appropriation of sea areas, two trends that are in 
contradiction with the current international rules, aims and goals concerning sea 
regulation. But firstly, these trends are already in progress. Secondly, the importance of 
environmental issues today requires we break with a legal system that has been conceived 
at a time when these major issues were massively ignored. As noted by a French author, 
Montego Bay and MARPOL conventions “are not immutable tools. The history of sea law is 
about States’ claims that were, at first, isolated but that ended up, by contagion effect, to the 
formation of a new set of rules. We can therefore not systematically blame, and in an absolute way, 
all dissident practices that could foresee a need of change”.  
21. Alongside of this major reform proposal, a second one can be mentioned that exceeds 
criminal law aspects: international conventions must now affirm the compulsory nature of 
vetting operations for the charterer companies, and state from now on that this obligation 
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is a performance one. This way, oil companies would be forced to pressure ship owners to 
provide ships that are in perfect conditions to avoid shipwrecks or leaks. Indeed, this 
proposal would help national jurisdictions to recognize what really hurts negligent oil 
companies (and incites them to change their behavior): their civil liability. According to the 
International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage (CLC-1969), an oil 
company’s civil liability can be engaged only in case of an intentional or a recklessness 
fault. Yet, a failure to a performance obligation can easily be assimilated to such a fault. 
Sure enough, this reform would change considerably the present state of shipwreck 
litigations.  
But to come back to criminal law considerations, this reform could also sustain a 
substantial change in the offense forbidden by the MARPOL convention. If the charterer is 
bound by a performance obligation, the conditions of use of Rule 11’s exemption cause 
could logically be modified in order to incorporate the charterer’s recklessness fault, 
alongside those of the ship owner and Master. This too, could change considerably the 
present state of shipwreck litigations.   
22. As regard to national legislation, the Prestige case allows us to make two significant 
considerations. In the first place, we believe that it should be pondered whether examining 
magistrate’s courts such as the one in Corcubión, a town of no more than 2,000 people, are 
appropriate to examine these types of complex cases, as it is obvious that the Corcubión 
court does not have the necessary human and material resources to examine a case 
featuring such a technical complexity and such economic and political implications as the 
Prestige one. 
23. Another aspect which has been visible in the Prestige case is the significant role of 
acciones populares—prosecutions brought in the name of the people—in Spanish criminal 
proceedings, although they do not fall into the domain of environmental criminal law. This 
institution, recognized in Section 125 of the Spanish Constitution, entitles any citizen other 
than the injured parties having some interest in the case to stand as prosecutor, and it has 
been called into question by a section of the doctrine. However, the Prestige case has shown 
once again the important role that these prosecutions can have in a political and legal 
context in which the Public Prosecutor seems to defend more the interests of the 
Government than the observance of the law.  
We would like to recall that the acciones populares brought by Izquierda Unida and the 
Nunca Mais movement have made it possible to put the director of the merchant navy on 
trial. For this reason, we think that national mechanisms such as acciones populares or even 
the establishment of a European public prosecutor’s office may prevent these situations. 
24. It’s all a question of criminal policy choices: either we really want to protect 
environment because we are convinced that it’s the only way to guarantee sustainable 
development for the future generations, and in this case, law must change substantially, 
either we continue to consider environment as an accessory issue, less important than 
economic interests, and in that case, current law will be maintained and political 
declarations of intentions will keep on being demagogic. Europe has a major responsibility 
on this issue. 
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